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Psychotherapy research is increasingly targeting both psychological and neurobiological 
mechanisms of therapeutic change. This trend is evident in and applicable to post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) treatment research given the high nonresponse rate of 
individuals with PTSD who undergo cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). A review of 
the literature investigating neurobiological mechanisms of CBT in PTSD reveals 
inconsistent results that fail to fully support dual process or learning models of CBT 
effects in the brain. However, network-based models of psychopathology provide a new 
framework from which to understand both mental disorder symptoms and therapeutic 
mechanisms. The current study investigated a) whether brain networks commonly 
implicated in psychopathology (e.g., default mode network [DMN], central executive 
network [CEN], and salience network [SN]) changed following Cognitive Processing 
Therapy (CPT) for PTSD and b) whether change in these networks was associated with 
PTSD and/or transdiagnostic symptom change. Independent components analysis was 
implemented to investigate resting-state functional connectivity in DMN, CEN, and SN 
in 42 women with PTSD and 18 trauma-exposed controls (TEC). Results indicated no 
significant differences in DMN, CEN, or SN functional connectivity in participants with 
PTSD versus TEC before or after CPT. Further, participants who completed CPT did not 
evince significant change in these networks pre- or post-CPT. Several methodological 
reasons for null results and future directions for research are discussed. 
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Neurobiological Mechanisms of Cognitive Processing Therapy for Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder: A Brain Network Approach 
Psychotherapy research has established that cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is 
effective for anxiety and stress disorders, although prevalence rates of mental disorders 
remain relatively stable (Kessler et al., 2005). In some disorders, such as post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), this problem is amplified by high rates of nonresponse in 
individuals who undergo CBT (Schottenbauer et al., 2008). This dilemma has prompted a 
wealth of research on mechanisms of therapeutic change, which are defined as the precise 
processes or events that caused the change (Kazdin, 2007). Research on therapy 
mechanisms enables scientist-practitioners to understand why therapy is effective and 
thus ultimately deliver more efficient treatments (Kazdin, 2007). Neuroscience 
approaches have increasingly been used to study neural substrates of cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral variables. Investigating the neural correlates of psychotherapy 
mechanisms is an attempt to understand how psychotherapy affects those neurobiological 
systems.  
Two related methods to study the relation between psychotherapy and brain 
change exist. Lueken and Hahn (2016) and Fournier and Price (2014) contrast 
mechanistic and predictive approaches to studying psychotherapy effects in the brain. 
These authors note that mechanistic approaches seek a model of the psychotherapeutic 
process and predictive approaches seek to understand neurological markers of individual 
treatment response. As such, though mechanistic and predictive methods are 
complementary, they answer different theoretical questions about the relation between 
psychotherapy and neurobiology. This paper will focus solely on mechanistic studies of 




CBT in PTSD, necessarily with pre- and post-treatment designs. CBT was selected given 
its extensive evidence base, its status as either a ‘well-established’ or ‘probably 
efficacious’ treatment for PTSD (Chambless et al., 1998), and its frequent use in the 
literature. Studies were only included if CBT produced clinically significant 
improvement in symptom measures.  
PTSD & Cognitive Behavioral Models of PTSD 
 Post-traumatic stress disorder has received significant clinical and research 
attention given its lifetime prevalence rate of 6.1 %, its detrimental impact on social and 
occupational functioning, and its high comorbidity with other mental disorders (Goldstein 
et al., 2016). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, 
Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) denotes three symptom clusters that characterize PTSD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The first cluster includes re-experiencing 
symptoms, such as recurrent memories, thoughts, or dreams of the event, flashbacks, and 
physiological reactivity to trauma reminders. The second cluster involves persistent 
avoidance of trauma-related cognitions (e.g., thoughts, memories), emotions, and 
environmental stimuli, as well as emotional numbing (e.g., restricted affect range, 
decreased interest in activities, and detachment from others). The third cluster captures 
heightened physiological arousal, as demonstrated by sleep difficulty, hypervigilance, 
irritability, difficulty concentrating, and an exaggerated startle response (APA, 2000). To 
meet criteria for PTSD, an individual must exhibit symptoms from each cluster following 
exposure to a traumatic event.  
CBT theory assumes that cognitions, affect, behavior, and physiology interact to 
contribute to mental disorders (Westbrook et al., 2011). CBT most frequently targets 




change in behaviors and cognitions that are presumed to underlie the specific mental 
disorder (Zayfert & Becker, 2007). As such, cognition and behavior are the indices used 
to assess change during and after treatment; importantly, behavior change is often 
implemented through cognitive change and vice versa (Dobson & Dozois, 2010). 
Common CBT techniques include cognitive restructuring and exposure; these are also 
applicable to CBT for PTSD (Zayfert & Becker, 2007). Cognitive restructuring assumes 
that emotional distress is the result of maladaptive thoughts and has the goal of modifying 
these thoughts to reduce distress (Dobson & Dozois, 2010). Similarly, exposure, which 
can involve in-vivo, imaginal, or interoceptive methods, is thought to facilitate extinction 
learning, or new associations between the feared stimulus and a more neutral meaning 
(Vorstenbosch et al., 2014). Although CBT occasionally involves other techniques (e.g., 
relaxation, mindfulness), they have not been widely investigated in neuroimaging studies 
of PTSD treatment outcomes and will thus not be reviewed in this paper.  
Cognitive behavioral conceptualizations of PTSD stemmed from Mowrer’s two-
factor theory of anxiety, which posited that a learned fear response arises due to classical 
conditioning and is maintained due to operant conditioning (Zayfert & Becker, 2007; 
Cahill & Foa, 2004). In PTSD, the traumatic event, and contextual variables from the 
event (e.g., sights, sounds, smells, etc.) become associated with a physiological fight, 
flight or freeze response and with intense emotions. Subsequently, individuals with PTSD 
behaviorally and cognitively avoid trauma reminders, thus both failing to extinguish the 
association between the reminders and their response and perpetuating avoidance 
behavior via negative reinforcement. As such, PTSD theorists emphasize behavioral and 




cognitive avoidance of trauma reminders as a critical factor in the disorder (Zayfert & 
Becker, 2007; Cahill & Foa, 2004).  
Later CBT conceptualizations of PTSD elaborate on this conditioning principle. 
Emotional processing theory posits that a traumatic event is stored in a ‘fear structure’ in 
the client’s memory, which includes representations of trauma stimuli, emotional and 
physiological responses, and thoughts or meanings about the trauma. Subsequent contact 
with one part of the fear structure (e.g., an environmental trauma reminder) then activates 
the other components of the fear structure (Cahill & Foa, 2004). Treatment of this 
pathological fear structure thus requires activating the fear structure to enable the learning 
of corrective information- e.g., that trauma reminders do not always signify imminent 
danger, and/or that one can confront a trauma reminder without experiencing feared 
outcomes. Prolonged exposure is designed to achieve this and to prevent the negative 
reinforcement that avoiding trauma stimuli provides (Cahill & Foa, 2004).  
Other conceptualizations of PTSD focus on belief systems that are either 
disrupted or reinforced by a traumatic event. Schema theories of PTSD note that 
processing a trauma requires resolving the conflict between beliefs the individual had 
before the trauma and what the occurrence of the trauma means about themselves or the 
world (Zayfert & Becker, 2007; Cahill & Foa, 2004). Interestingly, schema theorists 
suggest that re-experiencing symptoms result from cognitive attempts to resolve this 
conflict (Cahill & Foa, 2004). Often, this discrepancy can result in non-anxious emotions 
also common in PTSD, such as shame, anger, or guilt (Zayfert & Becker, 2007). An 
appropriate intervention to address maladaptive schemas is cognitive restructuring. 
Notably, both emotional processing and schema theories require the individual to 




confront stimuli he/she has been avoiding (e.g., thoughts or emotions about the trauma, 
environmental trauma stimuli) in order to achieve PTSD remission. This confrontation 
may occur via exposure or cognitive restructuring techniques (and often require both) 
(Zayfert & Becker, 2007). 
In addition to the above CBT conceptualization of PTSD, some researchers have 
observed that emotion dysregulation plays a “key role” in PTSD (Liberzon & Sripada, 
2008; Sheynin & Liberzon, 2017). Emotion regulation is defined as “how we try to 
influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and 
express these emotions” (Gross, 2008, p. 497). Gross (2008) has outlined five processes 
through which humans regulate emotions. Cognitive control of emotion refers to two 
such processes comprising attentional deployment (e.g., distraction, rumination) and 
cognitive change (e.g., reappraisal of the meaning of the situation) (Gross, 2008; Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005; Hartley & Phelps, 2010). These are contrasted with other emotion 
regulation processes, including behavioral response modulation (e.g., avoidance, 
relaxation) and the selection and modification of specific types of situations leading to 
emotions (Gross, 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). The cognitive change strategy of the 
cognitive control of emotion is analogous to cognitive restructuring, whereas behavioral 
response modulation and selection/modification of specific situations are addressed by 
exposure techniques.  
Biological Correlates of PTSD 
As previously reviewed, a prominent conceptualization of PTSD is that it results 
from impaired fear learning and extinction. An extensive literature on fear conditioning 
and extinction across animals and humans has established distinct neural regions 




associated with these learning processes. The basolateral amygdala is the structure most 
associated with fear conditioning or acquisition. During fear conditioning, the basolateral 
nuclei of the amygdala process sensory input from the cortex and thalamus while the 
central nucleus modulates physiological fear responses originating in the brain stem 
(Casey et al.,2015; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), and particularly the dorsal and rostral divisions of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), either promotes or inhibits fear expressions via projections to the amygdala, and 
is routinely activated during fear conditioning and extinction trials, respectively (Casey et 
al., 2015; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Similarly, the hippocampus, which projects to both the 
amygdala and VMPFC, can promote an amygdala fear response or facilitate contextual 
fear extinction depending on the presence of threat or safety in the environment (Casey et 
al., 2015; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). As such, the amygdala, hippocampus, and dorsal and 
rostral divisions of the ACC are commonly activated during fear conditioning and 
extinction trials (Shin & Liberzon, 2010).  
These regions are similarly extensively cited in neurobiological models of PTSD. 
The most commonly cited neuroanatomical model of PTSD posits that a hyporesponsive 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) fails to inhibit a hyperresponsive amygdala when 
encountering threat stimuli. A hyperresponsive amygdala leads to hyperarousal 
symptoms, whereas the hyporesponsive MPFC prevents both fear extinction and the 
individual from being able to shift attention away from trauma reminders. Further, 
dysfunctional hippocampi contribute to problems with identifying safe contexts (Rauch et 
al., 2006; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Finally, PTSD also involves a hyperactive insula (Shin 
& Liberzon, 2010; Shvil et al., 2013). This model has been supported by a wealth of 




research documenting greater amygdala responses when PTSD participants are exposed 
to trauma stimuli, masked and unmasked fearful faces, and fear conditioning trials in 
addition to reduced MPFC activation when PTSD participants are exposed to trauma 
stimuli, negative emotional stimuli, and fear extinction trials (Rauch et al., 2006; Shin & 
Liberzon, 2010; Shvil et al., 2013). Importantly, numerous researchers distinguish the 
rostral ACC and VMPFC functions in emotion regulation from the dorsal ACC and 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) functions in emotion awareness (Duval et al., 
2015; Clark & Beck, 2010; Lipka et al., 2014). PTSD participants have normal or 
exaggerated dorsal ACC activation during fear conditioning and a hyporesponsive rostral 
ACC (Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Additionally, there is evidence that the hippocampus 
shows decreased activation when PTSD participants undergo learning paradigms (Rauch 
et al., 2006), although other researchers observe that the direction of hippocampal 
activation (e.g., increased or decreased) differs based on the task used (Shin & Liberzon, 
2010). Finally, the insula is increasingly implicated in PTSD pathology, with 
hyperresponsivity noted during presentation of trauma stimuli, negative emotional 
stimuli, and fear conditioning/extinction tasks (Shin & Liberzon, 2010; Shvil et al., 
2013).  
Notably, regions involved in extinction and conditioning are also recruited during 
processing of negative emotions. In a quantitative meta-analysis, Patel et al. (2012) found 
that across cognitive, emotional, and symptom provocation paradigms, PTSD participants 
showed a) greater activation in amygdala, hippocampus, insula, and putamen and b) 
decreased activation in the posterior cingulate, MPFC, and left middle frontal gyrus 
compared to healthy controls. However, PTSD participants showed a) greater activation 




in dorsal ACC, precuneus, and medial temporal lobe and b) decreased activation in 
MPFC, parahippocampal gyrus, lateral PFC, dorsal ACC, and orbitofrontal cortex 
compared to trauma-exposed controls. The authors note that the amygdala only exhibits 
increased activation in PTSD compared to healthy controls; however, the MPFC appears 
to evince hypoactivation across comparison groups.  
Another meta-analysis compared regions recruited during emotional processing in 
PTSD, social anxiety, and specific phobia. Results indicated that the only commonality in 
all three disorders was hyperactivity of the amygdala and insula while processing 
negative stimuli (e.g., emotional facial expressions, trauma scripts, or phobic objects) 
(Etkin & Wager, 2007). Although amygdala hyperactivation was more common in social 
anxiety and specific phobia than PTSD, it was also present during fear conditioning in 
healthy controls and was thus proposed to represent a general “engagement of fear 
circuitry” (Etkin & Wager, 2007, p. 1482). Additionally, PTSD was the only disorder that 
exhibited hypoactivations, with hypoactivation of VMPFC during emotional processing 
associated with greater symptomology. Importantly, hypoactive frontal regions were 
associated with hyperactive limbic regions in PTSD, with no hyper- or hypoactivity of 
frontal regions found in social anxiety or specific phobia (Etkin & Wager, 2007). The 
authors conceptualize these results as indicative of PTSD being a “more complex” 
disorder than social anxiety and specific phobia, as it involves both intense fear and more 
widespread emotional dysregulation (Etkin & Wager, 2007, p. 1483).  
However, some argue that altered fear conditioning and extinction processes do 
not account for all symptoms of PTSD, including re-experiencing and avoidance 
(Liberzon & Martis, 2006). Indeed, later researchers specifically highlight the MPFC and 




its role in contextualization processes in order to more fully explain PTSD symptomology 
(Patel et al., 2012; Liberzon & Garfinkel, 2009; Liberzon & Sripada, 2008). The 
contextualization hypothesis notes that the MPFC, in addition to its role in inhibiting the 
amygdala, assists in contextualizing stimuli across numerous domains (e.g., cognitive, 
social, and internal), which enables the individual to appropriately respond to the 
environment. In PTSD, failure to interpret trauma reminders within the current spatial 
and temporal context could lead to re-experiencing symptoms. Further, emotional 
numbing could result from a failure to experience emotions consistent with the context 
(Liberzon & Garfinkel, 2009; Liberzon & Sripada, 2008).  
In sum, PTSD is posited to be a result of a hyperresponsive amygdala, insula, and 
dorsal ACC to threat stimuli. PTSD also appears to show a hyporesponsive rostral ACC 
when viewing negative emotional stimuli, suggesting the VMPFC inadequately inhibits 
the amygdala in this disorder (Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Additionally, PTSD patients show 
an inability, or resistance to, extinction and extinction recall (Graham & Milad, 2011). 
Finally, altered hippocampal activity, in combination with MPFC hyporesponsivity, leads 
to problems with contextualization processes. Though initial biological models of PTSD 
focused on altered threat detection and fear learning systems, others observe that these 
processes are not specific to PTSD pathology (Liberzon & Martis, 2006) and point 
instead to dysfunctional MPFC contextualization as the “core process” of the disorder 
(Liberzon & Garfinkel, 2009). 
General Models of Psychotherapy Action in the Brain 
Models of psychotherapy action in the PTSD brain are not specific to PTSD and 
are largely based on theories of altered pathology in anxiety disorders. Authors 




hypothesizing extinction as the underlying mechanism of anxiety disorders conceptualize 
exposure therapy as invoking extinction of learned responses (Roffman et al., 2005; 
Graham & Milad, 2011). Indeed, Etkin et al. (2005) describe “the biology of 
psychotherapy” as a “biology of learning” (p. 146). As such, changes following 
psychotherapy may necessarily appear in regions engaged in fear conditioning and 
extinction, and may involve either reduced activation of limbic areas (e.g., amygdala), 
increased activation of VMPFC, or both (Roffman et al., 2005; Porto et al., 2009; 
Sheynin & Liberzon, 2017).  
In contrast, dual process models of brain changes after psychotherapy suggest that 
psychotherapy promotes explicit emotion regulation via prefrontal cortical structures 
(e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,  ACC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) strengthening 
their activity in relation to subcortical limbic structures in the presence of emotional 
stimuli (Messina et al., 2013; Messina et al.,2016; Kumari, 2006; Frewen et al., 2008; 
Fournier & Price, 2014; Brooks & Stein, 2015; Sheynin & Liberzon, 2017). This is also 
the theory proposed by cognitive therapy developers, who report that cognitive therapy 
corrects “biased information processing and dysfunctional schema activation” (Clark & 
Beck, 2010, p. 419) by reducing activation in subcortical structures like the amygdala and 
hippocampus (“bottom-up”) and increasing activation in prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions 
responsible for the cognitive control of emotion (“top-down” or inhibitory) (Clark & 
Beck, 2010; Etkin et al., 2005; Hartley & Phelps, 2010). Others describe the change as 
exaggerated fear circuits in limbic and hippocampal regions becoming inhibited by PFC 
regions affected by cognitive restructuring learned in therapy (Brooks & Stein, 2015; 
Straube, 2016; Porto et al., 2009; Lueken & Hahn, 2016). Additionally, Etkin et al. 




(2005) note that neuroimaging studies of psychotherapy have both demonstrated 
normalization effects, in which resting-state brain activity in treated groups resembles 
that of healthy controls after treatment (as also described in Barsaglini et al., 2014), and 
stimulus-specific effects, in which brain activity during symptom provocation is altered 
after treatment. It has also been suggested that psychotherapy aids the activation of 
“compensatory” brain regions, or regions that did not show altered activity before 
treatment (Barsaglini et al., 2014; Etkin, 2014; Weingarten & Strauman, 2015; Straube, 
2016). This might be indicated by activation changes in PFC regions in patients after 
treatment that were not significantly different from healthy controls before treatment. As 
such, therapy effects would manifest in regions that did not indicate pathology prior to 
therapy.  
 An important caveat in the literature is the significant overlap between the brain 
regions implicated in emotion regulation and learning models, as both are thought to 
involve prefrontal inhibition of emotionally reactive brain regions (Messina et al., 2013). 
As such, both extinction and emotion regulation proponents suggest psychotherapy 
decreases amygdala activation and increases VMPFC activation, but their theories differ 
on precise mechanism of this change. This results in a thorny theoretical impasse, as 
hypotheses for both models are the same and results implicating amygdala and VMPFC 
activity do not falsify either theory. However, this may also be a false distinction between 
these concepts. For example, though some researchers argue that extinction models do 
not account for the cognitive features of anxiety disorders, particularly catastrophic 
interpretations of feared stimuli (Graham & Milad, 2011), others report that exposure 
therapy involves focusing attention on emotional stimuli (De Raedt, 2006) and thus 




cannot proceed without the involvement of cognitive processes (Hofmann, 2008; Bishop, 
2007). Specifically, exposure therapy involves altering the participant’s perception of 
controllability, predictability and the expected harm from the relationship between the 
conditioned and unconditioned stimulus, which is also the target of cognitive 
restructuring techniques (Hofmann, 2008). Conversely, DeRaedt (2006) notes that 
behavioral experiments designed to test emotionally arousing cognitive errors should also 
recruit the hippocampus to inhibit the amygdala, as the patient learns the arousing 
situation can also be safe. Importantly, altered amygdala-prefrontal circuitry is associated 
with both associative learning processes (e.g., exposure) and with the negative 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (e.g., cognitive restructuring), suggesting that both a 
conditioned stimulus and an ambiguous stimulus signal potential danger to the anxious 
person (Bishop, 2007). Hartley and Phelps (2010) cite research that directly addresses the 
overlap in brain regions in extinction and cognitive control of emotion, which found that 
when undergoing both processes, amygdala activation decreases and VMPFC activation 
increases. However, lateral PFC regions are only activated when participants use 
cognitive control strategies (Hartley & Phelps, 2010). Importantly, lateral PFC has no 
direct projections to the amygdala, but does project to the amygdala via VMPFC (Hartley 
& Phelps, 2010).  
Brain Changes after CBT in PTSD 
In a brief report, Felmingham et al. (2007) found that following eight sessions of 
exposure and cognitive restructuring, eight PTSD patients showed greater activation in 
the bilateral rostral ACC, left middle temporal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, and 
hippocampus in response to fearful faces compared to neutral faces- e.g., while 




processing fear. Further, increased activation in ACC was associated with change in 
symptom severity, such that patients with the greatest symptom reduction evinced the 
greatest increase in ACC activation after treatment (Felmingham et al., 2007). Notably, 
though amygdala activation did not differ between pre- and post-treatment scans, bilateral 
amygdala activation was negatively correlated with change in symptom severity, such 
that patients with the greatest symptom reduction showed decreased amygdala activation 
during fear processing (Felmingham et al., 2007).  The authors interpreted these results as 
an indication of fear extinction learning.  
Similar results were found by Peres et al. (2007), who utilized single photon 
emission computed tomography (SPECT) imaging in patients with subthreshold PTSD 
symptoms who read a personalized trauma script after exposure and cognitive 
restructuring. Like Felmingham et al. (2007), they found a positive correlation between 
change in blood flow to the PFC and scores on the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale 
(CAPS), as well as a negative correlation between change in blood flow to amygdala and 
CAPS scores (Peres et al., 2007). Further, compared to a wait-list control group of other 
subthreshold PTSD patients, the treated patients showed increased blood flow to the 
parietal lobes, ACC, hippocampus, thalamus, and PFC after exposure and cognitive 
restructuring therapy (Peres et al., 2007). In contrast, they exhibited decreased blood flow 
to left amygdala. The authors also interpreted this as PFC inhibition of the amygdala after 
treatment, with increased thalamic and hippocampal activity interpreted as reflecting 
integration of sensory details into the traumatic memory (Peres et al., 2007).  
Importantly, one study examined psychotherapy effects on policemen who had 
experienced the same traumatic event (Peres et al., 2011). The authors administered 




exposure and cognitive restructuring therapy to 24 policemen who exhibited subthreshold 
PTSD symptoms- specifically, hyperarousal and re-experiencing, but not 
avoidance/numbing, symptoms. Prior to treatment, both the treatment group and a wait-
list control group which also exhibited subthreshold symptoms showed increased 
amygdala and decreased medial PFC activation when exposed to a trauma-related sound 
sequence (e.g., gunfire; Peres et al., 2011). After therapy, the treatment group had 
significantly decreased amygdala activation compared to before therapy. Additionally, 
the treatment group showed significantly greater medial PFC activation than the wait-list 
control group when hearing the trauma-related sound sequence (Peres et al., 2011). 
Notably, the treated group showed similar activation patterns to the healthy control group 
(who had also experienced the same trauma), suggesting that therapy normalized the 
treated group’s amygdala and MPFC activation to levels in the asymptomatic group. As 
in the previous PTSD studies, Peres et al. (2011) found a positive correlation between 
change in symptom severity and MPFC activation, and a negative correlation between 
symptom severity change and amygdala activation change after therapy. However, a 
major limitation to this study is that the sample underwent other therapies in conjunction 
with exposure and cognitive restructuring as mandated by the police force’s own 
guidelines. Additional therapies included art therapy and ecological walks over a 28-day 
rehabilitation program, calling into question the specificity of the treatment effects to 
CBT.  
Fonzo et al. (2017) examined the neurobiological changes associated with 
emotional processing and reappraisal tasks after participants completed 9-12 prolonged 
exposure sessions. In line with dual process models of psychotherapy and neurocircuitry 




theories of PTSD, they hypothesized that prolonged exposure would decrease insula and 
amygdala activation and increase PFC activation during these tasks. The tasks required 
participants to identify the color of emotional faces, identify the emotion expressed by a 
face when superimposed with a conflicting emotion word, and engage in reappraisal 
when presented with a negative image (Fonzo et al., 2017). Compared to a wait-list 
control group (n = 30), the treated group (n =36) exhibited increased activation in the left 
lateral frontopolar cortex specifically during the reappraisal task following prolonged 
exposure. Further, change in activation of this region was positively correlated with 
hyperarousal symptoms and psychological well-being in the treated group, but not in the 
wait-list control group. The authors observe this result fails to support the dual process 
model, and instead suggests that prolonged exposure prompts brain changes during 
cognitive reappraisal in the frontopolar cortex, without affecting limbic regions (Fonzo et 
al., 2017). 
Aupperle et al. (2013) investigated whether a 12-week cognitive trauma therapy 
designed for women who had experienced interpersonal violence affected neural activity 
during a) cued anticipation and b) presentation of negative and positive affective images. 
Eleven women who met full PTSD criteria and three women with subclinical PTSD 
symptoms completed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans before and 
after Cognitive Trauma Therapy for Battered Women (CTT-BW). Results indicated that 
after treatment, activation in the left ACC and left posterior cingulate increased during 
the anticipation phase and activation in the right anterior insula decreased (Aupperle et 
al., 2013). Further, treatment response was correlated with decreased activation in the left 
anterior insula, posterior cingulate, and precuneus and increased activation in the right 




posterior insula. In contrast, during the presentation phase, bilateral posterior cingulate 
and right inferior parietal cortex activation increased after treatment, whereas DLPFC and 
right amygdala activation decreased. Treatment response was correlated with increased 
activation in the precuneus, posterior cingulate, left posterior insula, medial frontal, 
precentral, lingual, and inferior temporal gyri, and cerebellum. Response was also 
correlated with decreased activation in the right superior temporal gyrus, cerebellum, and 
caudate (Aupperle et al., 2013). Like other reviewed studies, the authors interpret 
increased ACC activation during the anticipation phase after treatment as a sign of 
enhanced emotion regulation.  They hypothesized that this enhanced emotion regulation 
may have in turn attenuated the DLPFC response during the presentation phase, when the 
participant was confronted with the affective stimulus (Aupperle et al., 2013). Finally, 
Aupperle et al. (2013) suggest that the reduced insula and amygdala activation following 
treatment indicate normalization of these regions; however, this hypothesis could not be 
tested in this study given the lack of a control group. 
Summary 
 Most studies indicated therapy resulted in greater activation in inhibitory regions 
of PFC and that change in activation was positively correlated with symptom 
improvement (Felmingham et al., 2007; Peres et al., 2007, 2011; Fonzo et al., 2017; also 
reviewed in Brooks & Stein, 2015). These changes were noted in general emotion 
processing (Felmingham et al., 2007), emotion regulation (Fonzo et al., 2017) and 
trauma-specific symptom-provocation tasks (Peres et al., 2007, 2011). Though Aupperle 
et al. (2013) also found increased rostral ACC activation during anticipation of an 
affective picture following CBT, this activation was not correlated with symptom 




improvement. Interestingly, the authors also found evidence of reduced DLPFC 
activation during the presentation of an affective picture following CBT. Further, though 
the amygdala evinced no change after treatment in two studies (Felmingham et al., 2007. 
Fonzo et al., 2017), it exhibited decreased activation after treatment in three others (Peres 
et al., 2007, 2011; Aupperle et al., 2013). However, amygdala activation negatively 
correlated with symptom measures in three studies (Felmingham et al., 2007; Peres et al., 
2007, 2011). Aupperle et al. (2013) additionally found evidence of reduced anterior 
insula activation during anticipation of an affective picture following CBT, with change 
in insula activation correlated with treatment response. 
Critical Summary  
In three of the five reviewed studies, the amygdala exhibited decreased activation 
during task scans following CBT, providing some support for the role of CBT in altering 
subcortical fear systems. However, decreased amygdala activation was not consistent, 
and limited evidence of a) reduced insula or dorsal ACC activation b) changes in 
hippocampal activation was found. Further, PFC changes after CBT were not localized to 
one region, although support for change in the rostral ACC, lateral frontopolar cortex, 
and DLPFC was found.  
Mixed findings on the precise location and direction of change in prefrontal 
regions after therapy, in conjunction with limited or no change in other brain regions 
associated with PTSD (e.g., insula, hippocampus) suggests that the CBT effect on brain 
regions is more complex than that accounted for in dual process and extinction models 
(as also noted by Messina et al., 2013; Barsaglini et al., 2014; Fournier & Price, 2014). 
Prochaska et al. (2008) compiled a list of criteria to evaluate theories, which include 




clarity, consistency, parsimony, testability, and empirical adequacy, among others. 
Although dual process and extinction models of psychotherapy are clear and consistent 
(e.g., they are operationalized, explicit, and non-contradictory), parsimonious (implying 
that psychotherapy affects one set of processes), and testable, mixed results of changes in 
brain regions denoted in both theories calls their empirical adequacy into question 
(Prochaska et al.2008).  As noted by numerous authors, these inconsistencies in results 
are likely an effect of methodology, with unclear conclusions about CBT effects likely an 
effect of incomprehensive theories.  
Methodological Critique. Across the reviewed literature, methodological 
differences complicate comparisons between studies and thus, conclusions about CBT 
mechanisms in the brain. For example, studies employed a range of scanning techniques 
(fMRI versus SPECT), paradigms (emotional processing, symptom provocation, and 
emotion regulation) and CBT modalities (individual versus group; Roffman et al., 2005; 
Straube, 2016).  As such, CBT appears to affect brain activity during symptom 
provocation and processing of negative emotional stimuli in PTSD. It is important to note 
the task used influences the interpretation of CBT effects. For example, symptom 
provocation tasks may not capture all implicated symptoms of the disorder: a trauma 
script may engage the re-experiencing, but not the avoidance or numbing, symptoms of 
PTSD (Frewen et al., 2008). This is a major limitation to the current research, and future 
studies should attempt to investigate brain changes across paradigms (MacNamara et al., 
2016).  
In addition to the above differences, researcher decisions on sample size, 
appropriate comparison groups, and appropriate assessments affect study results. Small 




sample sizes were recruited in most studies, thus potentially making them under-powered 
to detect more changes (Frewen et al., 2008). Importantly, the use of a healthy and 
psychiatric control group at baseline confirms that brain functioning in clinical 
populations is ‘abnormal’ to begin with (e.g., compared to healthy controls) and not 
different between the treated and wait list clinical groups (Frewen et al., 2008; Fournier 
& Price, 2014). Appropriate comparison groups would also reduce the likelihood that 
observed changes were due to passage of time, and not treatment effects (Roffman et al., 
2005). Additionally, Frewen et al. (2008) recommend future psychotherapy studies 
collect and correlate measures of psychological mechanisms of change with imaging 
findings. This would allow conclusions as to whether the purported psychotherapeutic 
mechanism was responsible for clinical change, or whether symptom reduction occurred 
independent of this mechanism (Frewen et al., 2008). Linden (2006) importantly states 
that current designs do not allow conclusions about whether brain changes after therapy 
(e.g., decreased amygdala activation) are the cause or effect of symptom reduction via 
therapy. As such, he notes that neuroimaging studies of CBT effects are not immune to 
the third (or confounding) variable problem, as it is plausible that changes in other brain 
areas led to altered stimulus processing in limbic regions (Linden, 2006). This highlights 
a critical distinction between brain regions associated with symptom 
expression/remission and those that serve as mechanisms of CBT, which have frequently 
been conflated (Etkin et al., 2005).  
Conceptual Critique. One reason the amygdala might be demonstrating 
equivocal change after CBT for PTSD is explained by the following theory. A recent 
“two-systems” view of fear and anxiety posits that regions responsible for generating 




behavioral responses to threat are separate from those responsible for generating 
conscious feelings of fear and anxiety (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). In this model, subcortical 
structures like the amygdala produce behavioral responses to threat, whereas lateral and 
medial PFC and insula produce conscious states of fear and anxiety. This is supported by 
research showing that 1) amygdala activation is not always correlated with subjective fear 
ratings, and 2) amygdala activation also occurs in response to subliminally processed 
threat (e.g., without conscious fear) (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Crucially, the authors 
propose that the amygdala is not the center of a “fear circuit” that leads to conscious 
feeling states, but rather serves to detect threat and modulate circuits that are responsible 
for consciousness and thus, fearful feelings (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). The crux of this 
argument is that researchers cannot conflate the subcortical regions producing behavioral 
and physiological responses to threat detection with cortical regions causing subjective 
anxiety or fear states. Thus, the previously reviewed studies which solely employ threat 
detection tasks to measure CBT effects may not be adequately investigating regions that 
contribute to anxious states when individuals are not processing threat, e.g., in a resting 
state. As such, treatments might target either a hyperactive subcortical or cortical circuit, 
and cognitive therapies may be more appropriate for individuals with ‘normal’ 
subcortical circuits and ‘abnormal’ cortical circuits (LeDoux & Pine, 2016).  This might 
explain why CBT effects across brain regions are inconsistent (as individuals in the same 
study might have differently activated circuits) and why symptom measures do not 
always correlate with brain changes in subcortical circuits (as symptom measures assess 
conscious feelings generated in cortical circuits).  




This problem is highlighted in two recent reviews of brain changes after therapy 
(Messina et al., 2013, 2016). In the first review, a meta-analysis including both 
depressive and anxiety disorders and a variety of therapy approaches (including CBT and 
Interpersonal Therapy), found activation changes in both resting-state and task scans in 
the fronto-parietal attentional system, which includes a region of the left superior and 
medial frontal gyrus. Additionally, the DMPFC, posterior cingulate, and a region of the 
temporal lobe evinced activation changes following treatment, which the authors interpret 
as change in self-related thought processes mediated by therapy (Messina et al., 2013). 
Importantly, when analyzing studies on specific phobia separately, Messina et al. (2013) 
found decreased activation in the parahippocampal gyrus after treatment, which supports 
a therapy effect on limbic regions in this disorder (although the absence of the amygdala 
and insula in this analysis is notable). However, the remaining results indicating 
treatment effects in brain regions not predicted by emotion regulation or extinction 
theories suggest a more comprehensive model of therapy effects is needed (Messina et 
al., 2013).  
Based on results from their meta-analysis, Messina et al. (2016) argued that 
psychotherapy may additionally affect implicit (as opposed to explicit) emotion 
regulation via changes in regions associated with semantic processing. Implicit or 
spontaneous emotion regulation may not involve executive processes, but semantic 
processes that encode and interpret external stimuli (Messina et al., 2016). Semantic 
processing occurs in the inferior parietal lobe, temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), anterior-
medial temporal lobes, VMPFC, and posterior cingulate. Whereas the VMPFC and 
inferior parietal lobe encode emotional semantic representations, the TPJ and temporal 




lobes encode social cognitive representations (Messina et al., 2016). Another meta-
analysis of cognitive reappraisal studies supports the notion that reappraisal modulates 
semantic representations of stimuli which uniquely affect the amygdala (Buhle et al., 
2014). It is possible that the cortical regions involved in semantic processing are those 
leading to conscious feeling states in the “two-systems” view of fear and anxiety, and 
thus the regions evincing change after CBT (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). 
New Directions: Network-Based Models of Psychopathology 
Conceptual Importance 
As suggested by the critique of the literature, the investigation of CBT 
mechanisms in the brain is hindered by two overarching problems- one concerning theory 
comprehensiveness and the other concerning methodology. First, the overlap between 
emotion regulation and extinction-based models of therapy effects mean that neither 
model can be falsified, as results can be found to fit either theory (Bishop, 2007). 
Furthermore, current results are inconsistent and do not fully support either theory, 
questioning the empirical adequacy of both (Prochaska et al., 2008). With regard to 
methodology, dual process models hinge on the idea that cortical structures are 
“strengthening control” over limbic structures. However, traditional fMRI analyses 
cannot directly test this hypothesis. Similarly, in the LeDoux and Pine (2016) “two 
systems” model, the insula and MPFC are cortical regions thought to modulate fearful 
feelings, but also overlap with those implicated in fear extinction.  As such, fMRI 
activation studies that simply note change in these disparate regions cannot determine to 
which circuit the insula and MPFC belong. Clearly, a new type of methodology is needed 
to clarify the hypotheses generated by different theories.  Functional connectivity 




analyses, which investigate the functional correlations between brain regions, are more 
appropriate for both testing the dual process model (e.g., investigating relations between 
brain regions) and elaborating on treatment effects in the brain after CBT (as also noted 
in Barsaglini et al., 2014). Further, connectivity analyses allow the investigation of brain 
networks. As argued by the National Institute of Health Research Domain Criteria, 
psychological disorders often represent deficits in multiple domains (attention, emotion 
regulation, cognition, etc.) which are more accurately encapsulated by network models 
(Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). Numerous network-based models of psychopathology have 
been posited, which could also be used to test psychotherapy effects. As such, utilizing 
functional connectivity analyses to investigate neurobiological mechanisms of CBT both 
addresses a critical methodological issue in the literature and enables the generation of 
new theories. 
Network-Based Models of Psychopathology  
Network-based models of psychopathology refer to “cognition-specific brain 
circuits” that are implicated in transdiagnostic clinical symptoms. Network-based models 
of psychopathology suggest that abnormal connectivity within and between functional 
networks observed across neurodegenerative and psychological disorders results in 
transdiagnostic symptom clusters and is a key factor in pathology (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012; Menon, 2011). This finding has led some to refer to them as 
“disorders of brain connectivity” (Fornito & Bullmore, 2012). Transdiagnostic symptom 
clusters refer to deficits in executive, affective, motivational, and social functioning 
domains of cognition (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012). Indeed, disrupted 
functional connectivity within networks can essentially serve as an intermediate 




phenotype between genotype and clinical presentation (Fornito & Bullmore, 2012). 
Network models argue for a systems, as opposed to regional, level of analysis (Fornito & 
Bullmore, 2012; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012).  
A tri-partite model of psychopathology and aberrant cognitive and affective 
networks was first proposed by Menon (2011). The first aberrant network implicated is 
the central executive network (CEN), which is activated during decision-making and 
working memory tasks (Menon, 2011), as well as being critical for attention allocation 
(Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg; 2012).  The CEN is a frontoparietal system which 
includes the lateral PFC, dorsal ACC, and posterior parietal cortices (Menon, 2011; 
Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012). The second aberrant network implicated is the 
salience network (SN), which is a corticolimbic system including lateral and medial PFC, 
ACC, amygdala, substantia nigra, and insula. The SN is responsible for processing salient 
environmental and internal information (including emotion) and is thus prone to 
influencing negative affective states (Menon, 2011; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 
2012). Fornito & Bullmore (2012) directly implicate this network in emotion regulation. 
The third aberrant network is the default mode network (DMN), which is commonly 
activated during resting states (as opposed to during cognitive tasks) or self-referential 
processes. The DMN comprises the lateral parietal lobes, posterior cingulate, and medial 
PFC (Menon, 2011; Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Fornito and Bullmore, 2012). 
Notably, though various disorders may exhibit aberrant connectivity in any of 
these core neurocognitive networks, Menon (2011) emphasizes that different disorders 
show different patterns of abnormal connectivity. For example, whereas depression and 
Alzheimer’s disease both have altered DMN connectivity, he notes that depressed 




patients show increased medial PFC connectivity, and those with Alzheimer’s disease 
show reduced posterior cingulate cortex connectivity (Menon, 2011). Further, the specific 
“dysfunction” in any one network differentiates clinical disorders by causing varied 
symptomology: in autism, social stimuli are improperly detected, whereas in social 
anxiety, social stimuli are over-detected. The disorder-specific symptom then leads to 
“cascading effects” with regard to attention allocation and other executive processes 
(Menon, 2011). The model further suggests that the SN, once it detects salient stimuli, 
facilitates the recruitment of the CEN and the disengagement of the DMN to produce a 
behavioral response to the stimulus (Menon, 2011). An abnormally functioning SN may 
either fail to adaptively detect salient stimuli (either enhancing or prohibiting detection), 
or fail to recruit other networks (e.g., CEN) to process stimuli (Menon, 2011). Thus, the 
interaction of these networks, particularly the SN and CEN, affect how information is 
processed and attention is allocated- and dysfunction in any one network can lead to 
dysfunction in the others (Menon, 2011).  
Proposed Dysfunctional Networks in PTSD 
Although initial dysconnectivity hypotheses centered on research findings in 
schizophrenia and autism (Menon, 2011), researchers are increasingly acknowledging the 
ways in which networks are specifically altered in PTSD. Currently, many researchers 
conceptualize PTSD network dysfunction in emotion-generating and modulating 
networks, similar to the dual process model previously reviewed.  Disrupted amygdala-
frontal networks have been demonstrated in PTSD (between the amygdala and medial 
PFC) in both task and resting states (Duval et al., 2015; MacNamara et al., 2016). These 
authors conceptualize these patterns as reflecting impaired emotion regulation and threat 




processing (MacNamara et al., 2016) or as an interaction of threat processing and 
emotion regulation circuits (Duval et al., 2015).  
A more recent review notes that functional connectivity studies in PTSD largely 
implicate altered connectivity within the networks of Menon’s tripartite model (2011). 
Akiki et al. (2017) hypothesize that re-experiencing, dissociation, and avoidance 
symptoms result from dysfunctional DMN connectivity, with altered CEN connectivity 
implicated in reduced prefrontal inhibition and attention/memory problems. Finally, they 
suggest disrupted SN connectivity translates to hyperarousal symptoms via increased 
sensitivity to threat detection. Taken together, the authors conceptualize PTSD as 
consisting of a hyperactive SN and hypoactive CEN and DMN. Further, the CEN is 
impaired in top-down regulation of the SN (Akiki et al., 2017). This aligns with other 
researchers who observed reduced DMN connectivity, altered SN connectivity, and 
increased connectivity between the DMN and SN in PTSD (MacNamara et al., 2016). 
These authors argue that rather than involving regional hypo- or hyper-activations, 
anxiety disorders may better be characterized as disorders of “widespread distributed 
disturbances in functional brain organization” (MacNamara et al., 2016, p. 282). 
However, increasing evidence for disruptions both within and between broader 
cognitive and emotional networks is mounting. Williams (2017) proposes that specific 
disruptions in DMN, SN, affective (e.g., “threat”), and attention networks might serve as 
“biotypes” for depressive and anxiety symptoms. Specifically, an anxiety or stress 
disorder “biotype” might involve hypoconnectivity within both the SN and the affective 
network, leading to feelings of apprehensiveness and threat dysregulation/arousal, 
respectively (Williams, 2017). Notably, Williams (2017) notes the overlap in nodes of the 




SN and affective networks, which both include different regions of the ACC, amygdala, 
and insula. The affective network additionally includes the VMPFC and hippocampus.  
Though these models speak to the etiology of PTSD, CBT’s effects on networks 
are less clearly defined.  If one hypothesizes that CBT normalizes the etiological 
processes of PTSD, the SN and CEN, which comprise oft-cited prefrontal-limbic regions, 
might be implicated first (Weingarten & Strauman; 2015). However, CBT may also 
modulate networks responsible for transdiagnostic symptoms inherent to anxiety and 
stress, such as impaired concentration (Frewen et al., 2008). In this case, the intermediate 
phenotypes (as described by Fornito & Bullmore, 2012) or transdiagnostic symptoms 
(Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Williams, 2017) of anxiety and stress disorders 
are affected by CBT (MacNamara et al., 2016). At any rate, researchers are beginning to 
propose that changes in functional connectivity networks will serve as “key 
neurobiological outcomes” of psychotherapy treatment research (Weingarten & 
Strauman, 2015, p. 201).  In PTSD specifically, investigating disrupted networks may 
serve as a better representation of the heterogeneous clinical profiles of those with PTSD 
than studies examining activity in isolated brain regions (Patel et al., 2012).  
Research on Mechanisms of CBT in PTSD Using Functional Connectivity Analyses 
Few studies have examined pre-post CBT brain changes in PTSD using functional 
connectivity analyses. As part of the larger previously reviewed study, Fonzo et al. 
(2017) found that the frontopolar cortex, which exhibited activation changes after 
prolonged exposure, also showed increased connectivity with VMPFC during a 
reappraisal task after treatment. The authors suggest this demonstrates that CBT enhances 
attention toward emotion regulation processes (Fonzo et al., 2017). A second study found 




that PTSD participants exhibited increased connectivity between rostral ACC and 
VMPFC during an extinction recall task after prolonged exposure treatment compared to 
a scan at baseline (Helpman et al., 2016).  A third study examining resting-state 
functional connectivity changes after prolonged exposure demonstrated increased 
connectivity between specific amygdala nuclei and orbitofrontal cortex as well as 
between hippocampus and MPFC in PTSD participants (Zhu et al., 2018). Notably, the 
connectivity between these regions was significantly reduced in PTSD participants 
compared to TEC before prolonged exposure but had normalized to TEC levels after 
treatment (Zhu et al., 2018). The authors concluded that this pattern indicated that PTSD 
participants had better ability to evaluate threat and process emotional information 
following prolonged exposure treatment (Zhu et al., 2018).  
 Another study found that after 16 weeks of group mindfulness-based exposure 
therapy, combat veterans with PTSD exhibited increased connectivity between the 
posterior cingulate in the DMN and prefrontal regions (DLPFC, ACC) compared to scans 
before treatment. Importantly, veterans who underwent an active control treatment did 
not show this pattern (King et al., 2016). Furthermore, posterior cingulate-DLPFC 
connectivity was associated with avoidance and hyperarousal symptom improvement 
(King et al., 2016). Notably, all connectivity analyses in these studies were restricted to 
specific regions, and future research should include data-driven approaches to uncover 
potential new mechanisms in other networks. No other studies investigating functional 
connectivity changes pre-post CBT in PTSD were found.  
 
 




Aims and Hypotheses 
Though CBT for PTSD causes brain changes that are often associated with symptom 
reduction, extant studies do not unilaterally support traditional dual process or learning 
models which posit that CBT has therapeutic effects via an emotion regulation or 
extinction mechanism, respectively.  The current research on neurobiological 
mechanisms of CBT for PTSD is plagued by a small literature with inconsistent results 
that likely stems from inconsistent methodology. For example, behavioral paradigms, 
imaging modalities, and comparison groups differ across studies. Beyond these 
methodological considerations, future research should utilize functional connectivity 
analyses, as opposed to traditional fMRI activation analyses, in order to test hypotheses 
about the relation among brain regions that are posited in dual process and extinction 
models. Additionally, brain network approaches may generate new hypotheses about a) 
disrupted neurobiological processes in PTSD and b) the reason therapeutic processes may 
engender their effects. Though this knowledge would be greatly beneficial to both 
psychotherapy and PTSD literatures, there is a dearth of research analyzing brain changes 
after CBT in PTSD using functional connectivity methods. Further, there is no research 
examining functional connectivity changes after Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) in 
a PTSD sample. The current study will address these gaps in the literature by utilizing 
functional connectivity analyses to examine changes in the DMN, CEN, and SN 
following CPT. These networks were selected based on their empirical support in healthy 
and psychiatric samples (Menon, 2011), as well as in PTSD (Akiki et al., 2017; 
MacNamara et al., 2016). 
 





 Investigate whether resting-state functional connectivity in DMN, CEN, and SN is 
significantly different between PTSD participants before and after CPT compared to 
trauma-exposed controls (TEC). 
Hypothesis 1. At Time 1, PTSD participants (n = 42) in the intent-to-treat sample 
will exhibit reduced DMN and CEN functional connectivity compared to TEC 
participants (n = 18). PTSD participants will also exhibit increased SN functional 
connectivity compared to TEC participants. 
Hypothesis 2A. At Time 1, PTSD participants (n = 26) who completed CPT will 
exhibit reduced DMN and CEN functional connectivity compared to TEC participants (n 
= 18). PTSD participants will also exhibit increased SN functional connectivity compared 
to TEC participants. 
Hypothesis 2B. At Time 2 (following CPT), PTSD participants (n = 26) will not 
exhibit significantly different DMN, CEN, or SN functional connectivity compared to 
TEC participants.  
Aim 2  
Investigate whether resting-state functional connectivity in DMN, CEN, and SN 
changes following CPT in PTSD participants.  
Hypothesis 3. PTSD participants (n = 26) will exhibit increased DMN and CEN 
functional connectivity and reduced SN functional connectivity after CPT compared to 
before CPT. 





 Investigate whether change in resting-state functional connectivity in DMN, 
CEN, and SN following CPT is related to change in PTSD and/or transdiagnostic 
symptoms. 
Hypothesis 4. Change in resting-state functional connectivity in DMN, CEN, and 
SN after CPT in PTSD participants will be correlated with change in PTSD symptoms as 
measured by the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS).  
Hypothesis 5. Change in resting-state functional connectivity in DMN, CEN and 
SN after CPT in PTSD participants will be correlated with change in rumination, positive 
affectivity, and negative affectivity (i.e., transdiagnostic symptoms of mental disorders).  
Exploratory Aim 
 Investigate whether change in resting-state functional connectivity in other 
networks identified by the current study’s analysis is related to change in PTSD and/or 
transdiagnostic symptoms following CPT. 
Method 
Participants  
All participants were already recruited from a larger study. The intent-to-treat 
sample included 42 women aged 18-55 with a DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of PTSD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) resulting from interpersonal violence and 18 
TEC. In the larger study, 16 women in the treatment group discontinued treatment, 
leaving 26 women with pre- and post-CPT data. Exclusion criteria from the larger study 




included: diagnosed neurological disorders, current substance abuse disorders, 
schizophrenia/psychotic disorder, bipolar, or obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Additionally, participants were excluded if they displayed active suicidality as 
determined by the investigator, were taking psychotropic drugs (e.g., beta blockers, 
antipsychotics, antidepressants), or had ever experienced a loss of consciousness greater 
than five minutes. All participants provided written informed consent in accordance with 
criteria established by the University's Human Subjects Committee.  
Measures Establishing PTSD Diagnostic Criteria  
Life Events Checklist  
This checklist is administered as part of the CAPS and is used to determine 
whether Criterion A for a PTSD diagnosis has been met. It contains items such as 
“physical assault,” “sexual assault,” and “other unwanted or uncomfortable sexual 
experience.” Participants endorsed events that have happened to them personally, that 
they have witnessed happening to someone else, or that they have learned happened to a 
close other. 
Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) 
 The CAPS is a 30-item structured interview that corresponds to the DSM-IV 
criteria for PTSD (Blake et al., 1995). The scoring criteria proposed by the authors 
consider a PTSD symptom present if the frequency of the CAPS item is rated as 1 or 
higher and the intensity is rated at a 2 or higher. Previous studies have reported high test-
retest reliability (r = .90-.98) and internal consistency (α = .94) of the overall severity 
score (Weathers & Litz, 1994). Additionally, severity scores for each symptom cluster 
displayed test-retest coefficients between .77-.96 and alpha coefficients between .85-.87 




(Weathers & Litz, 1994). For the current analysis, PTSD diagnosis will be based on 
cutoff scores > 45 on the CAPS.  
Measures for Hypothesis Testing 
Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) 
See above description. 
Ruminative Thought Style Questionnaire (RTS) 
This is a 20-item assessment measuring an individual’s tendency to ruminate 
(Brinker & Dozois, 2009).   Participants rate how well each statement describes them on 
a Likert scale from 1 to 7. Examples of items include “I find my mind often goes over 
things again and again,” “If I have an important event coming up, I can’t stop thinking 
about it,” and “I tend to replay past events as I would have liked them to happen” 
(Brinker & Dozois, 2009). The measure exhibits high internal consistency (α = .87) and 
test-retest reliability (r = .80) (Brinker & Dozois, 2009).  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded (PANAS-X) 
This 60-item assessment measures positive and negative affect, which are factors 
that contribute largely to mood states (Watson & Clark, 1999). Participants are provided 
a list of 60 words or phrases that describe emotional states and asked to rate on a Likert 
scale of 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”) how much they have felt that way in the last 
few weeks (Watson & Clark, 1999). Sample items include cheerful, lonely, nervous, 
ashamed, frightened, irritable, and distressed (Watson & Clark, 1999). Both the Positive 
Affect and Negative Affect scales of the PANAS-X display high internal consistency 
(ranging from .83 - .90) across student, nonclinical adult, and psychiatric samples 




(Watson & Clark, 1999). Further, the Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales are not 
highly correlated with each other, suggesting they are measuring independent constructs. 
Finally, both scales exhibit moderate test-retest reliability (.39 and .43 for Positive and 
Negative Affect, respectively) (Watson & Clark, 1999).  
Procedure  
 In the larger study, all participants completed a baseline assessment in which they 
were administered the CAPS, Life Events Checklist, RTS, and PANAS. On a second day, 
all participants underwent structural and resting-state fMRI scans, which lasted 
approximately 1.5 hours. Subsequently, participants diagnosed with PTSD received a 
standard course of CPT, a “strongly recommended” therapy for PTSD according to the 
American Psychological Association Clinical Practice Guideline for PTSD (American 
Psychological Association, 2017). After completing treatment, PTSD participants 
completed a follow-up assessment of the measures collected at baseline and underwent a 
second resting-state fMRI scan which lasted approximately 1.5 hours. In sum, PTSD 
participants who completed CPT underwent two fMRI scans. TEC completed one fMRI 
scan. 
fMRI Data Acquisition  
fMRI images were collected on a Siemens 3T TrioTim MRI scanner (Erlangen, 
Germany) as part of a larger study. The protocol included localizer images, a high-
resolution, magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) structural image, and 
a series of functional images. The structural images were acquired with 1×1×1mm3 
resolution using a sagittal 3-D T1-weighted sequence with repetition time (TR) of 2.4 s, 




time-to-echo (TE) of 3.13 ms, flip angle=8°, and inversion time (TI) of 1000 ms. 
Functional resting-state images were collected using an asymmetric spin-echo echo-
planar sequence TR=2.2 s, TE=27 ms, flip angle=90° and field of view (FOV) of 384 cm. 
One acquisition consisted of 36 transverse slices, 4 mm thick (no gap), and with an in-
plane resolution of 4×4 mm.  
Functional Connectivity Analysis  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging scans measure changes in the blood 
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal within brain tissue. Changes in the BOLD signal 
are considered an indirect measure of neuronal activity; thus, comparing the BOLD 
signal across different brain regions, groups, and paradigms (e.g., resting-state, emotional 
processing task, etc.) allows researchers to infer which regions are activated and how 
brain activation changes across these conditions (Rogers et al., 2007). Functional 
connectivity analyses measure BOLD signal correlations throughout the brain, indicating 
which anatomically separated regions may be functionally related during specific tasks or 
in specific groups (Biswal et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2007; Sheline et al., 2010). Brain 
regions with correlated BOLD signal over time or during performance of specific tasks 
are considered ‘functionally connected’ and part of the same brain network.  
 Functional connectivity can be measured with numerous types of analyses. The 
most common approach is seed-based connectivity, a univariate test which calculates the 
correlation between activity in a chosen “seed” region with activity in the rest of the brain 
(Margulies et al., 2010). However, this approach requires researchers to determine a 
priori regions of interest to examine. In contrast, independent components analysis (ICA) 
in fMRI uncovers spatial signals which are maximally independent over time (Calhoun et 




al., 2001).  It is a multivariate, data-driven approach which is ideal for examining brain 
activity when no models exist to inform seed region selection (Calhoun et al., 2003). 
Given the lack of research on pre-post CBT brain changes in PTSD using data-driven 
methods, the current study investigated functional connectivity networks using ICA. 
 As the current study conducted analyses on archival data, power analyses were 
not utilized. There are numerous arguments against the use of post-hoc power analyses in 
clinical trials (Levine & Ensom, 2001), in fMRI data (Mumford, 2012), and in scientific 
research generally (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001). These authors emphasize that post-hoc 
power analyses are redundant, as nonsignificant results inherently imply low observed 
power (Mumford, 2012; Levine & Ensom, 2001). Additionally, of the previously 
reviewed studies, samples ranged from 8-36 participants. Only one study (Fonzo et al., 
2017) analyzed more participants than our proposed analyses, suggesting that our sample 
size is adequate. 
Functional connectivity analyses were conducted using the group-ICA approach 
within the CONN toolbox (release 18.a; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012). 
Imaging data underwent spatial preprocessing using standard methods in the Statistical 
Parametric Mapping software package (SPM12) (Friston et al., 2007), which included 
realignment, slice-timing correction, coregistration, segmentation, normalization, and 
smoothing (using a 6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel) (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-
Castanon, 2012; Vergara et al., 2017).  Data then underwent denoising, which included 
regression of subject motion (e.g., realignment parameters) from the voxel- level time 
series, followed by linear detrending, despiking, and band-pass filtering at .008-.09 Hz.  




CONN implements spatial group-ICA analyses using methods previously 
described by Calhoun (Calhoun et al., 2001; 2009). As such, CONN conducted variance 
normalization pre-conditioning and concatenated the BOLD signal along the temporal 
dimension (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2017). After the fMRI data was pre-
processed (as described above), the number of independent components (e.g., functional 
connectivity networks) to be estimated was determined by the minimum description 
length technique as implemented in the GIFT toolbox (GIFT Documentation Team, 
2017). This technique resulted in an estimated 194 components in the data. However, 
review of other papers using ICA in PTSD samples indicated no other study had analyzed 
more than 44 components; therefore, 100 components were determined to be sufficient 
for this analysis (St. Jacques et al., 2013;  Shang et al., 2014; Rabellino et al., 2015; 
Tursich et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015; Reuveni et al., 2016). Subsequently, CONN 
utilized the G1 fastICA algorithm to identify 100 independent spatial components (e.g., 
functional connectivity networks) in the fMRI data. Finally, GICA3 back-projection was 
used to recreate individual subject spatial maps to be used in the second-level analyses 
(Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2017). All neuroimaging data (e.g., from both 
time points and all groups) was entered simultaneously into the group-ICA to ensure 
comparisons between the same components (networks) could be made.  
After these steps, CONN produced numerous spatial maps of brain regions whose 
z-scores were correlated in their time course. In this analysis, z-scores indicate the 
correlation between activation in each voxel (e.g., the BOLD signal) and the time course 
of the entire network. The produced spatial maps were then correlated with template 
maps within CONN. Template maps are commonly identified functional connectivity 




networks in the literature, such as the DMN, SN, and visual networks (Whitfield-Gabrieli 
& Nieto-Castanon, 2017). A high correlation between a spatial map identified in the 
current dataset and a template map within CONN indicated the presence of that network 
within the dataset. In this dataset, the components with the strongest correlation with the 
networks in the template map were selected for further analysis. In other words, the 
component with the highest correlation with the DMN, SN, and CEN template maps were 
selected as the DMN, SN, and CEN components, respectively.  Spatial maps that were 
composed of regions within white matter or cerebrospinal fluid were identified as noise 
and discarded from second-level analyses. White matter and cerebrospinal fluid are 
identified as noise because fMRI is only applied to gray matter in the brain. This method 
for selecting functional networks for second-level analysis has been utilized in Zhang et 
al. (2015), Liao et al. (2010), and Hoekzema et al. (2014). 
Second-Level Analyses 
All second-level analyses were conducted within the CONN toolbox (Whitfield-
Gabrieli & Nieto-Castanon, 2012) or in SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, 
Version 24.0). Of note, the CONN toolbox utilized voxel-level thresholds of p < .001 and 
cluster-level FDR-corrected thresholds of p < .05 to detect significant differences in brain 
activation between groups (Hypotheses 1-3). Additionally, data analyses only consisted 
of the planned comparisons outlined in the hypotheses and p-values, effect sizes, and 
confidence intervals are reported for each test (Althouse, 2016). Given the lack of 
research investigating brain network change after CPT for PTSD and the exploratory 
nature of the current study, these results will require future replication.  
 






Please see Table 1 for a summary of the demographic characteristics of the whole 
sample and each experimental group. Independent samples t-tests indicated that the ITT 
group did not significantly differ from TEC on age (t(58) = -0.26, p = .79) or education 
level (t(58) = 0.80, p = .43). Similarly, the PTSD treatment completer group did not 
significantly differ from TEC on age (t(42) = 0.53, p = .60) or education level (t(42) = 
1.05, p = .31). An independent samples t-test indicated that CAPS scores at Time 1 were 
not significantly different between participants who completed treatment and those that 
dropped out of treatment (t(40) = -0.34, p = .74). 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to determine the relation between 
length of time in treatment (in weeks) and change in PTSD and transdiagnostic symptoms 
(e.g., rumination, positive affectivity, negative affectivity) in the treatment completer 
sample. Symptom change was calculated by subtracting CAPS scores at Time 2 from 
CAPS scores at Time 1. Change in rumination, positive affectivity, and negative 
affectivity was calculated by subtracting participant’s scores at Time 2 from these same 
scores at Time 1. Time in treatment was not significantly correlated with change in CAPS 
(r(22) = .11, p = .62), rumination (r(22) =  -.15, p = .50), positive affectivity (r(22) = -.36, 
p = .09), or negative affectivity (r(22) = .05, p = .81) scores. This indicates that change in 
PTSD and transdiagnostic symptoms was not simply due to passage of time. Notably, a 
paired-samples t-test found that CAPS scores at Time 1 were significantly different from 




CAPS scores at Time 2 (t(23) = 12.18, p = .00), indicating that CPT resulted in a 
reduction of PTSD symptoms. Finally, age was considered as a possible covariate given 
evidence for the relation between age and network connectivity (Vértes & Bullmore, 
2015). To determine whether age should be included as a covariate in our analyses, we 
calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficient between age and connectivity in DMN, CEN, 
and SN at Time 1 and Time 2. Participant age was not significantly correlated with 
connectivity in any network at Time 1 or Time 2 (see Table 2). As such, age was not 
included as a covariate in our analyses. 
Data Cleaning 
 Z-scores for the DMN, CEN, and SN representing average connectivity within 
these networks at Time 1 and Time 2 were inspected for univariate outliers and 
normality. Univariate outliers were defined as those subjects whose z-scores were three 
standard deviations from the mean. At Time 1, inspection of histograms for DMN and SN 
appeared normal and there were no univariate outliers. Examination of the CEN 
histogram revealed a non-normal distribution, and there was one z-score outlier in the 
TEC group. Upon removal of this outlier, the histogram appeared normal and there were 
no univariate outliers. At Time 2, histograms for the DMN, CEN, and SN appeared 
normal and there were no univariate outliers. 
Aim 1 
  Three two-tailed independent-samples t-tests were used to compare the 1) DMN, 
2) CEN, and 3) SN network z-scores between experimental groups in each hypothesis. 
For Hypothesis 1, DMN, CEN, and SN z-scores in the intent-to-treat sample of PTSD 




participants were not significantly different from the DMN, CEN, and SN z-scores of 
TEC at Time 1 (see Table 3). For Hypothesis 2A, DMN, CEN, and SN z-scores from the 
Time 1 scan in the treatment completer sample of PTSD participants were not 
significantly different from the DMN, CEN, and SN z-scores of TEC (see Table 4). For 
Hypothesis 2B, DMN, CEN, and SN z-scores from the Time 2 scan in the treatment 
completer sample of PTSD participants were not significantly different from the DMN, 
CEN, and SN z-scores of TEC at Time 1 (see Table 5).  
Tests of Equivalence 
Fundamentally, a rejection of the null hypothesis when implementing null 
hypothesis significance testing (NHST) only indicates there was insufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis. Rejection of the null hypothesis does not indicate whether the 
alternative hypothesis is true or false (deGraaf & Sack, 2018), nor suggest that the null 
hypothesis should be accepted (Hupe, 2015). In other words, obtaining null results does 
not reflect evidence for the absence of an effect (deGraaf & Sack, 2018; Kazdin, 2003).  
One potential method of further evaluating null results is in using equivalence tests, 
which determine whether “effects that are large enough to be considered meaningful can 
be rejected” (Lakens et al., 2018). In one method of equivalence testing, the two-one 
sided tests procedure, upper and lower bounds are set based on the smallest effect size of 
interest the researcher deems meaningful, and two null hypotheses are tested: that the 
effect is less than the lower bound or greater than the upper bound (Lakens, 2017). If 
these tests are rejected, the researcher may conclude that the effect lies within the bounds, 
and is thus “practically equivalent” (Lakens, 2017). To determine whether the means 
between experimental groups in the above hypotheses were practically equivalent to each 




other, two one-sided tests of equivalence (TOST) were conducted for each of the above 
hypotheses using a spreadsheet provided in Lakens (2017). For each TOST, the smallest 
effect size of interest was determined by calculating the smallest effect size we would be 
able to observe based on our sample size, as demonstrated in Lakens et al. (2018).  
 Hypothesis 1. For Hypothesis 1, a sensitivity analysis in G*Power indicated that 
with sample sizes of 42 (ITT) and 18 (TEC) and an alpha of 5% (two-sided), we would 
have 80% power to detect an effect of d = 0.80. Subsequently, the upper and lower 
equivalence bounds were set at -0.80 and 0.80, following the guidelines by Lakens 
(2017). The TOST procedure indicated that the observed effect sizes in the DMN (t(58) = 
1.86, p = .03) and CEN (t(57) = 1.84, p = .04) were significantly within the equivalent 
bounds of d = -0.80 and d = 0.80, indicating that the functional connectivity within these 
networks in the ITT and TEC groups was statistically equivalent at Time 1 (Lakens et al., 
2018). However, the observed effect size of the SN (t(58) = 1.43, p = .08 was not 
significantly within the equivalent bounds, indicating we cannot reject an effect larger 
than d = 0.80 and SN connectivity in ITT and TEC groups is not statistically equivalent at 
Time 1 (Lakens et al., 2018). 
Hypothesis 2A and 2B. For Hypothesis 2A and 2B, a sensitivity analysis in 
G*Power indicated that with sample sizes of 26 (PTSD treatment completers) and 18 
(TEC) and an alpha of 5% (two-sided), we would have 80% power to detect an effect of d 
= 0.88. Subsequently, the upper and lower equivalence bounds were set at -0.88 and 0.88.  
Hypothesis 2A. The TOST procedure indicated that the observed effect sizes in 
the DMN (t(42) = -2.78, p = .00), CEN (t(41) = -2.85, p = .00), and SN (t(42) = 1.92, p = 
.03) were significantly within the equivalent bounds of d = -0.88 and d = 0.88, indicating 




that the functional connectivity within these networks in the TEC group were statistically 
equivalent to the functional connectivity in the PTSD treatment completers at Time 1 
(Lakens et al., 2018). 
Hypothesis 2B. The TOST procedure indicated that the observed effect sizes in 
the DMN (t(42) = -2.57, p = .01), CEN (t(41) = -2.73, p = .01), and SN (t(42) = 2.43, p = 
.01) were significantly within the equivalent bounds of d = -0.88 and d = 0.88, indicating 
that the functional connectivity within these networks in the TEC group were statistically 
equivalent to the functional connectivity in the PTSD treatment completers at Time 2 
(Lakens et al., 2018).  
Aim 2 
Three paired-samples t-tests were used to compare the 1) DMN, 2) CEN, and 3) 
SN z-scores in the treatment completer sample of PTSD participants at Time 1 versus 
Time 2. DMN, CEN, and SN z-scores at Time 1 were not significantly different from the 
z-scores at Time 2 (see Table 6). 
Tests of Equivalence 
TOSTs were also conducted for this aim. A sensitivity analysis in G*Power 
indicated that with a sample size of 26 PTSD treatment completers and an alpha of 5% 
(two-sided), we would have 80% power to detect an effect of d = 0.57. Subsequently, the 
upper and lower equivalence bounds were set at -0.57 and 0.57. The TOST procedure 
indicated that the observed effect sizes for the DMN (t(25) = -2.51, p = .01), CEN (t(25) 
= -2.77, p = .01), and SN (t(25) = -2.33, p = .01) were significantly within the equivalent 




bounds of d = -0.57 and d = 0.57, indicating that the z-scores of the PTSD treatment 
completers at Time 1 and Time 2 were statistically equivalent (Lakens et al., 2018).  
Aim 3 
Given the lack of statistically significant change in functional connectivity in 
DMN, CEN, or SN of the treatment completer sample from Time 1 to Time 2, 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 were not tested.  
Exploratory Aim 
For the exploratory aim, none of the remaining networks identified by the ICA 
exhibited statistically significant change in within-network functional connectivity from 
Time 1 to Time 2.  Thus, this aim was not tested.  
Discussion 
Results of our null hypothesis significance tests indicated that there were no 
differences in DMN, CEN or SN functional connectivity between participants with PTSD 
compared to TEC either pre- or post-CPT. Additionally, we did not find evidence of 
differences in DMN, CEN, or SN connectivity within PTSD participants from pre- to 
post- CPT. Equivalence tests largely found statistically equivalent connectivity in these 
networks between experimental groups and within the PTSD sample from Time 1 to 
Time 2; an exception was that SN connectivity did not appear equivalent between the ITT 
sample and TEC at Time 1. One possible interpretation of these results is that resting-
state functional connectivity in those with PTSD does not differ from TEC, and thus CPT 
could not lead to ‘normalization’ of resting-state functional connectivity in PTSD. 
Another possible interpretation is that CPT also does not generate ‘compensatory’ 




changes in resting-state functional connectivity in PTSD participants. However, the 
context of the null results, as well as several possible reasons for their production, merit 
further consideration prior to accepting these conclusions.  
First, there is little research investigating brain changes related to CPT 
specifically. Only one other study examining pre-post CPT brain changes has been 
published. This study demonstrated that participants who completed a present-centered 
(or control) treatment exhibited reduced SN connectivity during a symptom provocation 
task compared to pre-treatment (i.e., a normalization effect), but this effect was not 
exhibited in those who completed CPT (Abdallah et al., 2019). However, CPT 
participants did evidence increased executive network connectivity during symptom 
provocation after CPT. Notably, Abdallah et al. (2019) did not find any evidence of 
change in network functional connectivity during their resting-state scans. As such, the 
only other published study examining functional connectivity in CPT found increased 
executive network connectivity and stable SN connectivity during a symptom 
provocation task after CPT but no change in network connectivity after CPT in resting-
state scans. Our own null results are in alignment with this finding. Further, when 
examining all studies investigating change in functional connectivity pre- and post-CBT 
for PTSD (n = 5), three studies showed changes following Prolonged Exposure (one 
during a reappraisal task [Fonzo et al., 2017], one during an extinction recall task 
[Helpman et al., 2016], and one in a resting-state scan [Zhu et al., 2018]); one study 
showed resting-state changes following a mindfulness-based exposure intervention (King 
et al., 2016); and one showed changes after both CPT and a control treatment during 
symptom provocation (Abdallah et al., 2019). As such, there is some evidence for 




resting-state change after exposure-based interventions and some evidence for change 
after CPT in a symptom provocation scan, but no published evidence for resting-state 
change after CPT, suggesting that our null results may be unsurprising.  
Second, there are several differences between our study and previous research that 
may have precluded us from demonstrating any functional connectivity changes after a 
CBT intervention for PTSD. One difference was our selection of a resting-state scan, 
whereas others implemented a variety of behavioral paradigms examining functional 
connectivity in PTSD while symptoms were provoked, while CBT techniques were 
employed, and while the PTSD fear structure was activated. As previously noted in the 
literature review, this complicates comparison of results between studies, and more 
research would be needed to determine whether brain changes after CBT are more robust 
in particular paradigms. Another difference was our utilization of ICA, as opposed to a 
seed-based connectivity analysis. Though we believe this to be a strength, as it is a data-
driven method of network selection, it may not be directly comparable to studies that 
selected a priori networks of interest. Further, our sample was comprised of females, in 
contrast with other studies that used mixed sex samples. Sex differences in resting-state 
functional connectivity have been observed in several regions overlapping with DMN, 
SN, and CEN, including the cingulate, medial frontal cortex, insula, precuneus (Weis et 
al., 2019), and amygdala (Kilpatrick et al., 2006; Engman et al., 2016). Finally, this study 
focused exclusively on within-network functional connectivity. There is evidence that 
PTSD is also characterized by alterations in connectivity between networks (Akiki et al., 
2017; MacNamara et al., 2016), and it is possible that this between-network resting-state 
connectivity is affected by CPT. 




Third, beyond the previously discussed difficulties in comparing studies that use 
different tasks and types of connectivity analyses, there are also numerous 
methodological decisions within neuroimaging research that may lead to differing results 
even between studies that use the same tasks and connectivity analyses. These decisions 
are present at each stage of a neuroimaging analysis, from the ways in which the data are 
pre-processed (e.g., choice of how much data should be spatially smoothed, which 
impacts spatial precision; Lohmann et al., 2018; Vergara et al., 2017), to the ways in 
which second-level results are deemed significant. For example, researchers may apply 
liberal or conservative thresholds for defining significant results (Lohmann et al., 2018), 
potentially obtaining drastically different connectivity maps depending on the selected 
threshold (Klein, 2010). As such, several methodological decisions related to our 
neuroimaging analysis procedure may have influenced our results. We utilized a 
template-matching approach to identify networks of interest within our data. Though this 
was a procedure used by several other groups (Zhang et al., 2015; Liao et al., 2010; 
Hoekzema et al., 2014) and the correlations between our networks and the templates were 
similar to those obtained in other studies, our network-template correlations were 
moderate in size (versus large), indicating that our identified DMN, SN, and CEN did not 
overlap entirely with the template networks. Lack of precision in matching networks or 
regions of interest that were used in other studies is not a problem unique to our study but 
is instead common throughout neuroimaging research (Hong et al., 2019). Nonetheless, it 
could lead to problems replicating effects. We also utilized the default voxel- and cluster-
level thresholds within the CONN toolbox in order to define components. Notably, there 
is no standard threshold level in the literature, and the threshold levels selected across the 




pre-post CBT studies reviewed, as well as others using ICA analyses, differ accordingly. 
Taken together, it is possible our null results in comparison to other pre-post CBT for 
PTSD studies are due to some combination of these methodological factors.  
Fourth, we implemented NHST as our statistical framework. Limitations of 
NHST have been widely documented both within psychology (e.g., Cohen, 1994; 
Wagenmakers, 2007) and within neuroimaging research (Klein, 2010; Hupe, 2015; 
Friston, 2012). Briefly, limitations of NHST include the arbitrary definition of a 
significance level (at p < .05) and the fact that “statistically significant” results may be 
found with a large enough sample size (as summarized in Hupe, 2015). Many researchers 
have emphasized that this pattern makes the reporting of effect sizes crucial to 
determining whether a) a “statistically significant” effect is trivial or meaningful and b) 
the lack of a “statistically significant” effect was due to an under-powered study versus a 
trivial effect size. Within neuroimaging research, others argue that NHST is inappropriate 
in “causally dense systems” where the null hypothesis must be false due to small and 
unimportant correlations between variables (Klein, 2010). Within our study, we 
demonstrated small, but statistically nonsignificant, differences in DMN, CEN, and SN 
connectivity at Time 1 between our ITT sample and TEC, with TEC exhibiting greater 
connectivity in these networks compared to the ITT sample. Similarly, we found a 
statistically nonsignificant but small difference when comparing SN connectivity at Time 
1 between PTSD treatment completers and TEC, with TEC again exhibiting greater SN 
connectivity than PTSD treatment completers. Further, SN connectivity between the ITT 
sample and TEC at Time 1 was not statistically equivalent according to our test of 
equivalence, indicating that we could not reject the presence of large effects. These 




results are broadly in alignment with other studies finding diminished connectivity in 
PTSD versus TEC, and suggest the presence of some group differences in resting state 
connectivity at baseline, whose effect sizes may be better defined with a larger sample. 
Thus, the lack of statistically significant differences between groups in our study should 
not automatically dismiss the presence of these effects, which would require more 
research to delineate.   
Indeed, deGraaf and Sack (2018) posit that null results can be more or less 
meaningful and interpretable based on the context in which they occur. For example, if 
null results are obtained when replicating a study that has already found an effect or is 
attempting to bolster evidence for a well-established theory, these results may be more 
meaningful than null results found within the context of exploratory analyses in an area 
with little research. Similarly, if null results are obtained in studies that are low-powered 
or less methodologically stringent, they may be less interpretable than if null results were 
obtained in high-powered and carefully designed studies (deGraaf & Sack, 2018). When 
considering the exploratory nature of our research question, the lack of consistent results 
within the literature, and the presence of some small effect sizes in our data, our null 
results should not be considered to reflect the absence of CPT effects on resting-state 
functional connectivity networks within PTSD participants. Rather, they may be 
considered the outcome of several methodological decision points (potentially including 
sample size, method of network selection, and/or use of NHST). In other words, our null 
results may be less meaningful and interpretable than if we had used different 
methodologies or were attempting to replicate strong effects from the literature. 




Future research could address several of the above methodological limitations. 
First, sample size could be increased to maximize our power to determine whether an 
effect is small, moderate, or large (Hupe, 2015), giving us the ability to better quantify 
CPT effects in PTSD brain (Friston, 2012). (Of note, our sample size was similar to other 
studies reviewed that did obtain effects; as such, increasing the sample size in our study 
would be in an effort to better quantify the effect size and identify equivalence bounds for 
equivalence testing, as opposed to being an effort solely to obtain significant results.) 
Second, our voxel and cluster thresholds that defined our components could be modified. 
Third, future analyses may examine whether there are changes between networks pre- to 
post-CPT. Finally, analysis methods that do not rely on NHST (such as machine learning) 
may be considered.  
Conclusion 
This study implemented a data-driven functional connectivity analysis method to 
examine large-scale brain networks implicated in PTSD pathology in an effort to obtain 
evidence for either dual process or extinction models of CBT effects in the PTSD brain. 
In sum, the interpretation of our results is largely inconclusive. Though there may be no 
‘true’ effect of CPT on resting-state functional connectivity networks in PTSD, it is also 
possible that several methodological decisions may have prevented us from being able to 
adequately measure that effect in this study. This unfortunately precludes us from being 
able to provide evidence in support of either the dual process or extinction models of 
CBT effects on the brain. Nonetheless, this is the first study that implemented an ICA 
method in pursuit of this research question, and is only the second study to examine 
neurobiological changes after a course of CPT. As such, it is a unique contribution to 
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Completers ITT  TEC 
n 60 26 42 18 
Age (SD) 31.38 (9.67) 33.62 (11.09) 31.17 (9.71) 31.89 (9.84) 
Education (SD) 15.16 (2.57) 15.62 (1.63) 15.38 (1.89) 14.64 (3.73) 
CAPS T1  66.92 (17.71) 67.64 (17.35)  
CAPS T2  23.75 (20.89)   
Ethnicity (%)     
    Caucasian 37 (61.70) 16 (61.50) 25 (59.50) 12 (66.70) 
    African American 14 (23.30) 6 (23.10) 11 (26.20) 3 (16.70 
    Hispanic 2 (3.30) 1 (3.80) 2 (4.80) 0 
    Other 5 (8.30) 2 (7.70) 2 (4.80) 3 (16.70) 
    Not reported 2 (3.30) 1 (3.80) 2 (4.80) 0 
Note. ITT= Intent-to-treat sample of participants with PTSD. TEC= Trauma-exposed 
controls. CAPS= Clinician-Administered PTSD scale. 
  





Correlation of Age with Network Connectivity 
Statistic  Time 1   Time 2  
 DMN SN CEN DMN SN CEN 
Correlation (r) .01 .08 -.13 -.29 .17 -.20 
Significance (p) .92 .53 .34 .15 .41 .33 




Functional Connectivity at Time 1 in ITT vs TEC Participants 
Network   ITT     TEC   t df p 95% CI 
Effect 
size 
  n M SD n M SD       LL UL   
             
DMN 42 5.89 3.11 18 6.71 2.56 -1.00 58 .32 -2.49 0.84 -0.28 
CEN 42 6.09 2.98 17 6.95 3.64 -0.95 57 .35 -2.71 0.97 -0.27 
SN 42 6.13 3.98 18 7.61 3.02 -1.41 58 .17 -3.58 0.62 -0.40 
Note. ITT= intent-to-treat sample of participants with PTSD. TEC= trauma-exposed controls. CI= confidence interval. LL = 
lower limit. UL = upper limit. DMN= default mode network. CEN= central executive network. SN= salience network.  





Functional Connectivity at Time 1 in PTSD Treatment Completers vs TEC Participants 
Network PTSD TEC 
t df p 95% CI 
Effect 
size 
  n M SD n M SD       LL UL   
DMN 26 6.78 2.70 18 6.71 2.57 0.08 42 .94 -1.57 1.70 0.03 
CEN 26 6.97 3.49 17 6.95 3.64 0.01 41 .99 -2.22 2.24 0.01 
SN 26 6.52 4.18 18 7.61 3.02 -0.94 42 .35 -3.41 1.24 -0.29 
Note. PTSD = Post-traumatic stress disorder. TEC= trauma-exposed controls. CI= confidence interval. LL = lower limit. UL = 
upper limit. DMN= default mode network. CEN= central executive network. SN= salience network.  
  





Functional Connectivity at Time 2 in PTSD Treatment Completers vs TEC Participants at Time 1 
Network 
PTSD TEC t df p 95% CI 
Effect 
size 
  n M SD n M SD       LL UL   
DMN 26 6.96 2.87 18 6.71 2.57 0.29 42 .77 -1.45 1.95 0.09 
CEN 26 7.05 3.33 17 6.95 3.64 0.09 41 .93 -2.08 2.27 0.03 
SN 26 7.08 4.43 18 7.61 3.02 -0.44 42 .66 -2.96 1.90 -0.14 
Note. PTSD = Post-traumatic stress disorder. TEC= trauma-exposed controls. CI= confidence interval. LL = lower limit. UL = 
upper limit. DMN= default mode network. CEN= central executive network. SN= salience network.  
 
  





Functional Connectivity at Time 1 vs Time 2 in PTSD Treatment Completers 
Network 
T1 T2 t df p 95% CI 
Effect 
size 
  n M SD n M SD       LL UL   
DMN 26 6.78 2.7 26 6.96 2.87 -0.41 25 .69 -1.12 0.75 0.06 
CEN 26 6.97 3.49 26 7.05 3.34 -0.14 25 .89 -1.27 1.11 0.02 
SN 26 6.52 4.18 26 7.08 4.43 -0.57 25 .57 -2.56 1.45 0.13 
Note. T1= Time 1. T2 = Time 2. CI= confidence interval. LL = lower limit. UL = upper limit.  DMN= default mode network. 
CEN= central executive network. SN= salience network.  
 
 
